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Abstract
There are two ways that we might respond to the underdetermination of
theory by data. One response, which we can call the agnostic response,
is to suspend judgment: ‘Where scientific standards cannot guide us, we
should believe nothing.’ Another response, which we can call the fideist
response, is to believe whatever we would like to believe: ‘If science cannot speak to the question, then we may believe anything without science
ever contradicting us.’ C.S. Peirce recognized these options and suggested
evading the dilemma. It is a Logical Maxim, he suggests, that there could
be no genuine underdetermination. This is no longer a viable option in
the wake of developments in modern physics, so we must face the dilemma
head on. The agnostic and fideist responses to underdetermination represent fundamentally different epistemic viewpoints. Nevertheless, the
choice between them is not an unresolvable struggle between incommensurable worldviews. There are legitimate considerations tugging in each
direction. Given the balance of these considerations, there should be a
modest presumption of agnosticism. This may conflict with Peirce’s Logical Maxim, but it preserves all that we can preserve of the Peircean
motivation.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Peirce’s Logical Maxim
The concept of underdetermination
Our dilemma
Endgame

∗ My understanding of Peirce was nurtured by conversations at the University of California,
San Diego, through a succession of pragmatist reading groups. I am indebted to all the
participants in those groups, especially David Smith, Ilya Farber, and Naomi Oreskes. §3 of
the present paper is based on §1.3.3 of my [Mag03].
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The underdetermination of theory by data is often taken to guarantee that
some questions cannot be answered by any amount of enquiry. Underdetermination of this kind would confront us with a dilemma: Either we remain forever
and inexorably agnostic about the underdetermined questions or we apportion
our beliefs by fiat. C.S. Peirce recognized this dilemma, and we can use his
answer to it as a way of framing the problem. Peirce thought neither horn of
the dilemma was acceptable, so he suggested that there could be no underdetermination of this kind.
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Peirce’s Logical Maxim

In the manuscript written for his fourth lecture at Harvard in 1903, Peirce
claims that— as a matter of logic— we must never say that some questions
could never be answered. As we might say today, he denies that there could
be any underdetermination. (Contemporary discussions of underdetermination
often take Poincaré or Duhem as their starting point; Peirce here explicitly
takes issue with Poincaré.) “Let me recommend this Logical Maxim to you,”
he writes, “Never allow yourself to think that any definite problem is incapable
of being solved to any assignable degree of perfection” [Pei97, p. 273].1 Peirce
worries: If we do think that there is underdetermination, then we will either
make the error of agnosticism or the related mistake of “simply accept[ing] what
opinions suit our fancy or convenience, or seem likely to advance our interests”
[Pei97, p. 273]. This latter mistake of believing whatever is convenient is the
sort of vulgarity for which pragmatists have too often been condemned, but
Peirce thinks it is “the prevalent [mistake] in regard to philosophy, the world
over.”
Peirce suggests that matters which are presumed insoluble will be resolved
quickly enough when “the right distinction” is introduced [Pei97, p. 273]. If you
think some matter is insoluble, he writes:
The likelihood is that it will be solved long before you could have
dreamed possible. Think of Auguste Comte who when asked to
name any thing that could never be found out instanced the chemical
composition of the fixed stars; and almost before his book became
known to the world at large, the first steps had been taken in spectral
analysis. [Pei97, p. 273]
Peirce thinks that the Logical Maxim can be given an “historical induction”
with examples of this kind. Start with the example of Comte, who wrongly
thought that theories of stellar composition were underdetermined. If we look
around, Peirce suggests, we will see that alleged underdetermination has always
or often been resolved in the course of enquiry.
Peirce also thinks that the Logical Maxim admits of stronger demonstration.
“It rests,” he says, “on the consideration of the nature of reasoning . . .[and]. . .
experimentation” [Pei97, p. 274]. Underdetermination would thus be inimical to
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the very nature of experimental method. Unfortunately, he says nothing further
in the manuscript to suggest what this consideration is supposed to be.
We should be less sanguine about the verdict of an historical induction and
considerations of experimental reasoning. Given developments since Peirce’s
time, we have been led by reasoning and experiment to accept quantum mechanics and relativity. Each entails limits to enquiry that resist dissolution by
“the right distinction.” According to many interpretations of quantum mechanics, the theory posits states of the world that we cannot discover beyond some
knowable degree of precision. General relativity is even more striking; it entails
that the structure of spacetime can preclude our learning certain important facts
about the world [Gly77] [Mal77]. It seems as if it must be impossible to have a
causal influence on our own past, for example, but relativity entails that— if it
were impossible— the structure of spacetime would make it impossible for any
observer to know this [Mal77, pp. 71–2]. If it were possible to influence our own
past, then it might be possible to know this. Nevertheless, physicists do not
allow logic to dictate whether such closed causal curves exist. Here in history
and practice, physicists have not followed Peirce’s Logical Maxim. One might
say that physicists are wrong and that they should follow the Maxim, but one
cannot then appeal to the history and practice of physics as support for the
Logical Maxim itself.
So there is a prima facie conflict between modern physics and Peirce’s Logical Maxim. In §4.2, I consider a different interpretation of the Maxim which
could reconcile it with physics. For now, let’s consider what we might do when
faced with insolubilia. As Peirce notes, we would be forced into a dilemma
between agnosticism and willy-nilly belief. So which should it be?
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The concept of underdetermination

Before exploring the dilemma in the next section, I want to be clear about what
‘underdetermination’ means in this context. Plausibly, the term refers to cases
where responsible theory choice would be impossible given any logically possible
evidence— think of Cartesian sceptical scenarios in which ‘everything is just as
if there were an external world.’ It is also natural to say that the choice between
theories is underdetermined if it would be impossible to decide between them
given the laws of nature— for instance, determination of the global structure of
spacetime might require travelling faster than the speed of light (as in Glymour
[Gly77] and Malament [Mal77], cited above). Other authors speak of ‘transient
underdetermination’ that effects theory choice in early historical periods but
not at later times (as in Sklar [Skl85] and Stanford [Sta01]). All of these involve
an inability to decide between theories, but the inability is of different scope in
each case.
As such, specifying a case of underdetermination involves specifying the
range of possible circumstances across which responsible theory choice would
be impossible. Call this range of circumstances the scope of the underdetermination. The choice between belief in an external world and belief in a Cartesian
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sceptical scenario, if it is underdetermined, is underdetermination with a scope
that includes all logically possible circumstances. The global structure of spacetime is underdetermined with a scope that includes only nomologically possible
circumstances. Transient cases will be underdetermined with a scope that includes earlier circumstances but not later ones. In general, we can entertain
cases where the scope is any range of circumstances whatsoever. If the choice
between rival theories cannot be made responsibly given any of the circumstances in the scope, then we can say that the theory choice is underdetermined
with that scope. Menacing cases of underdetermination will be those for which
our present circumstance is in the scope of the case (We can’t responsibly distinguish between the theories now) and it would be hard or impossible for us to
escape the scope (We can’t change our circumstances so that we could distinguish between the theories).
A claim of underdetermination, then, is a claim that ordinary scientific considerations leave scientists no way to decide between competing theories in a
certain range of circumstances. This implicitly relies on a conception of ordinary scientific considerations; that is, a standard for how scientists may responsibly decide between theories. Specifying a case of underdetermination thus
requires specifying three things (at least implicitly): rival theories, a scope, and
a standard.2
With these ideas in place, let’s return to the dilemma.
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Our dilemma

Cases of underdetermination with maximal scope— cases that could not be
decided responsibly under any imaginable circumstances— elicit these two conflicting intuitions. The agnostic intuition is that, since the choice is forever
beyond determination, one ought forever to suspend judgment about which of
the rivals is true. The fideist intuition is that one might freely believe one of
the rivals even now, since further enquiry will have no bearing on the question
either way. The agnostic impulse is, in effect, to insist that the usual standard
for responsible choice should hold even when it makes a theory choice undetermined with maximal scope; the only responsible thing to do in such cases is to
be indifferent between the rivals. Contrarily, the fideist suggests that where a
theory choice is underdetermined with maximal scope given the usual standard,
one ought to suspend the usual standard in favor of the standard ‘Believe what
you will.’ On this alternate standard, the choice need not be underdetermined.
The agnostic may try to provide a direct answer to the fideist by arguing that
the usual standards are the unique standards of rationality. Scientific standards
are historical products, however, and calling them rational does not show that
they should apply under all circumstances. The fideist, after all, is arguing
about what counts as reasonable.
As the terms are often used, ‘agnosticism’ and ‘fideism’ regard religious
questions. Here I mean them to pick out views about how to respond to underdetermination in general— whether the enquiry is religious or secular. The
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agnostic approach is reflected in Descartes’ reply to the sceptical scenarios and
in much of the modern tradition. The fideist approach can be found in the writings inter alia of James [Jam48], Duhem [Duh54], and van Fraassen [van02],
although I am overlooking certain subtleties in their views. For instance, James
advocates fideism only for ‘forced’ and ‘momentous’ questions. This parallels the
distinction Peirce sometimes draws between ‘vital’ questions and those which
may be settled by rational enquiry. Regarding this complicated issue, see Hookway [Hoo02, esp. ch. 1]. For the sake of discussion here, I will sidestep it and
consider the unqualified fideism that makes no such distinction.

3.1

A test case: Other minds

An example may help evoke these intuitions. Let the set of rivals contain one
theory according to which you and most other human beings have minds and
another according to which only you the reader have a mind and everyone else
merely behaves as if they do. The rivalry between these two theories amounts
to the familiar problem of other minds. It is arguably underdetermined with
maximal scope, since the two rivals would lead us to expect exactly the same
course of events in the world.
There is a sense in which fideism regarding this question could do no harm.
If there were any negative repercussions from choosing the wrong theory, then
there would be a circumstance in which you could decide the question: You
could see in retrospect that the other one must have been preferable, and fallout
from choosing poorly would provide a sort of experimental test. If the choice
is underdetermined with a scope that includes all circumstances, such tests are
precluded. So no harm could come from being a fideist.
Yet the fact that the theory choice has no practical consequences that could
be used to test either theory does not entail that it has no practical consequences
tout court. If you believe that you would have moral duties to people that you
would not have to automatons, then there is a practical difference between the
two. From one theory, it follows that you have a duty not to commit murder;
from the other, it follows that murder is of a kind with smashing a television.
Further experience will not contradict you in either case, but you may well act
differently if you believe one rather than the other. How would you act if, taking
the agnostic position, you remained indifferent between the two possibilities?
How would you order your affairs if you lived with a real and persistent doubt
as to whether other humans had mental lives like you have? It is tempting
to think that you would become what the rest of us would call a sociopath.
Sincere agnosticism about other minds, like solipsism, carries at least the hint
of madness. Given your willingness to say that other people have experiences
just as you do, doesn’t it mean you are willing to relax your epistemic scruples
on this matter?
If so, then the fideist wins the point. The agnostic may respond by arguing that the problem is not underdetermined. She may say: The madness of
suspending judgement on this matter shows that the choice is not underdetermined even on ordinary standards, since any reasonable standard would allow
5

you to choose the sane choice over the mad one. Philosophers have offered a
panoply of reasons to believe in other minds rather than solipsism— readers are
invited to consider their favorites. If such arguments are successful, then the
case is not underdetermined. Thus, the agnostic may admit that there is an
intuition about other minds while denying that the intuition speaks to the issue
of underdetermination.

3.2

The cost of fideism

Moreover, the agnostic may insist, fideism could do unintended harm. Good
querists realize that reflective and deliberate application of standards is not
enough. They try to develop habits of applying the standards of responsible
theory choice; they cultivate these inclinations, so that they would feel uncomfortable accepting claims for which no good reasons can be adduced. They also
place themselves in a social order that enforces the standards for responsible
theory choice, they willingly put themselves in a situation where they would be
chastised for capricious belief. The fideist only deliberately suspends the usual
standard when a theory choice is underdetermined with maximal scope, to be
sure, but he must thus work to weaken his and the community’s habitual application of the usual standard. Suppose that the choice between two theories
is underdetermined with a maximal scope and that the fideist prefers to believe
one rather than the other. If he ever has occasion to consider his choice, he will
need to steel himself against his habituated unease; he will need to suppress the
reaction which he cultivates in usual cases. Perhaps in reflective moments he
will apply the usual standards as well as any querist. In more mundane moments, though, his habits will be weaker than those of the agnostics who spent
no energy weakening theirs. There may well come a time when he will blunder
where they might apply the usual standard by force of habit.3
The fideist might reply: It is an empirical question as to whether querists
are best served by relying on brute habit. Perhaps for the bulk of enquiry and
for the bulk of querists, for normal scientists doing normal science, this will be
the case. Those who are of stronger character can distinguish between cases,
however. They will recognize the differences between cases underdetermined
with maximal scope where they may believe as they will and cases underdetermined with narrower scope. Why should such stronger types be held back from
exercising their strong character?
The agnostic replies in turn: It is doubtful that anyone has such a strong
character, but that is— as you say— an empirical matter. Even if some scientists
do have such a character, they should not exercise it. As it is said: “Be careful
that the exercise of your freedom does not become a stumbling block to the
weak.” [1Corinthians, 8:9]. Other scientists would either decide that they, too,
could believe as they chose or be forced to admit that they had weak cognitive
constitutions. If the former, then their habits would be weakened. If the latter,
then they would be disheartened, and an unhealthy social division would be
drawn among scientists. Thus if any scientists are such that their habits will
be significantly eroded by fideism, then the whole community should embrace
6

agnosticism.
The fideist replies, of course, but we can leave them to the dialogue. There
are open questions of the degree to which habit formation is a good way to
instill the usual standards of reasonable theory choice, the degree to which
fideism would undercut these habits, and the degree to which fideism for a few
would disrupt the community. These are questions which must be answered by
further methodological reflection and psychological data.

3.3

Fideism and narrower scope

The fideist intuition is strongest in cases, like the alleged underdetermination
about other minds, where the scope is maximal. The fideist may further wish
to suspend the usual standards of responsibility for choices which are underdetermined with a narrower scope— for instance, a scope of all naturally possible circumstances as defined by some well-confirmed background theory. This
would exacerbate the problem of poor habits, since choices which are subject to
the usual standards may closely resemble ones which are exempted from those
standards.
Consider that special relativity entails that an observer cannot be affected
by events outside her past light cone.4 Supposing that she can only responsibly make theory choices on the basis of events to which she has some causal
connection, specific claims about events outside her past light cone will be underdetermined for her with a scope constrained by what is possible given the
laws of nature. Consider two events, call them I and O. Suppose that I was,
from our observer’s frame of reference, one thousand years in the past and 50
cm inside the surface of her past light cone and that O was, again from the
observer’s frame of reference, simultaneous with I but 50 cm outside the surface
of her past light cone. (As in figure 1.)
[ Float figure 1 here. Caption: The observer may be effected now by I, but
not by O, since the latter is outside the observer’s past light cone. ]
Following the fideism here on offer, she may believe whatever she likes about
O but not so with I which was a mere meter away— even if I was some small
event which would be practically impossible for her to discern. This is subject
to the same worries about personal habit and social norms as fideism applied
to cases of maximal scope, but perhaps she can will her belief about O while
reminding herself that she only has this freedom because of relativity, without
being less apt to notice errors in reasoning about I, and without harming the
social order. Insofar as she can do that, however, she is encouraged to treat relativity as an inevitable and immutable constraint on possibility. If she seriously
allowed for the possibility that it might be false, she would treat O as of a kind
with I, both as events that she could not discern. Thus, fideist treatment of
a particular claim about O would undercut her ability to be a fallibilist about
the background theories that specify the relevant sense of natural possibility.
Since she only needs to protect her willful judgment about O, she could allow
for theory changes that would further constrain (rather than expand) the relevant sense of possibility. Since responsible change in theory may as easily open
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new possibilities as close them, however, this half-hearted fallibilism offers little
comfort.
The fideist approach may be applied to cases of still narrower scope, but the
problems only increase. Further problems arise and— for a theory choice underdetermined only with a scope so narrow that it excludes recognized, practical
possibilities— agnosticism clearly wins out. Imagine, as an example of such a
case, the question of whether there are serious side effects associated with an
exotic drug. A large-scale, clinical trial would resolve the question, but it is
underdetermined with a scope that includes only circumstances where the trial
has not been performed.5 If we have not performed the trial, we are not in a
position to say whether the drug has side effects. Yet it would be perverse to
decide that it does have side effects if we merely find the drug distasteful. Here
the fideist intuition has no sway. More generally, it would be perverse to will
to believe regarding a matter that would be open to investigation if only we
would will to investigate. The fideist suggestion was to substitute the standard
‘Believe what you will’ for the usual standard in some special cases, but invoking
that standard in cases that might be resolved by ordinary investigation is— in
effect— to insist that it should be the usual standard.

4

Endgame

To summarize the action so far: There is an intuition that in cases underdetermined with maximal scope it would be permissible to believe anything, since the
course of events would never force one to alter the willed belief. Such a practice
may have deleterious consequences for individuals and for the community, but
whether it does is an open and at least partly empirical question. The only
plausible fideism regards cases of very wide scope, so underdetermination with
middling and narrower scope will require a different response regardless.

4.1

An uneasy resolution

Since we don’t know exactly how high the costs of fideism would be, we face a
decision under uncertainty. We might make a leap of faith and deem the costs of
fideism to be low enough, but this would be tantamount to being a fideist about
the cost of fideism. The question of what fideism costs is at least partly empirical
and hence is not underdetermined with maximal scope. Further enquiry could
tell us more about it.
As I’ve argued, fideism becomes implausible for narrow scope cases like this
one. It is thus incumbent on the fideist to show either that the indirect costs
of fideism are negligible, that the costs are worth paying, or (contra what I
argued above) that fideism is the right response to some questions which are
underdetermined only with a narrow scope. Until one of these is shown, we
should be agnostic about the costs of fideism.
The agnostic gives the conservative counsel that we should apply the usual
standards in all cases. The fideist pleads for a risky special standard. Until we
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know more about what might follow from unusual standards in unusual cases,
prudence demands agnosticism. So there should be a modest presumption in
favor of agnosticism generally. Agnosticism wins the day not with a bang, but
a whimper.

4.2

What’s left of the Logical Maxim

Peirce was serious, I think, about the Logical Maxim prohibiting us ever to say
that a particular problem could not be solved to an assignable degree. He did
identify agnosticism and (what I’ve called) fideism as our two options should
we face insoluble problems, but he didn’t think we should seriously entertain
either. He would have viewed the discussion here as, at best, a hypothetical
exercise with an impossible antecedent. So Peirce would have bristled at where
modern physics has taken us. Nevertheless, I don’t think that the insolubilia
entailed by modern physics need have worried him too much.
Peirce’s Logical Maxim would require that we say it is impossible for enquiry
to face some insurmountable barrier. However, this is ambiguous. Following
Peirce, we can distinguish between two senses of possibility: a subjective and an
objective sense. (See [Pei98, p. 355] and also [Mey02, p. 147].) The subjective
sense is an epistemic modality: P is (subjectively) possible if we cannot be
certain that ∼P . The objective sense is a real modality: P is (objectively)
possible if is not nomologically necessary that ∼P .
Let D(E, p) stand for ‘It is objectively possible to resolve enquiry E to
precision p.’ We can understand Peirce’s Logical Maxim in two ways:
LM1 : ‘For all E, p, D(E, p)’
LM2 : ‘For all E, p, it’s subjectively possible that D(E, p)’
For the reasons offered above, LM1 conflicts with contemporary physics. That
is, we now think that it is nomologically impossible to resolve certain questions.
Yet we can show that LM2 has no such conflict. We now believe a theory
T that entails ∼D(E, p) for some E. That is, T entails that enquiry E could
never be resolved. If we recognize that our belief is fallible, then we believe T
provisionally. Perhaps as a practical matter we might abandon active pursuit of
E, but we should not ruthlessly prohibit speculation about it. We should expect
never to settle E, but that expectation should never be more secure than our
provisional belief in T .
The agnosticism that worried Peirce in the Harvard lectures is “a recommendation that a certain line of inquiry be entirely abandoned” [Pei97, p. 273,
my emphasis]. As we’ve just seen, the agnostic response to underdetermination
does not provide such a recommendation. It counsels instead that we should
suspend judgment until more evidence becomes available. If our physics tells
us that there will never be evidence to settle the matter, then we should not
expect it to be settled. But we would only consider the matter completely closed
if we think that our physics is infallible. As we’ve seen, treating a question as
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forever underdetermined requires treating the limitation on knowledge as eternally fixed. This, I think, is what would have worried Peirce the most— the
connection between underdetermination and a dogmatism about the limits of
knowledge.
If we understand Peirce’s Logical Maxim as LM2 , there is a simple argument
for it. Peirce advocates what Meyers calls unrestricted fallibilism, the doctrine
that “no proposition can be known with certainty and hence that we may be
mistaken about any proposition” [Mey02, p. 145]. We can rewrite it this way:
U F : ‘For all P , it’s subjectively possible that ∼P ’
If we instantiate U F for an arbitrary ∼D(E, p), LM2 follows as an immediate
consequence. Since we know that Peirce thought of fallibilism as a matter of
methodology, this might have been the what Peirce had in mind.
If so, his example of Auguste Comte is misleading. There is no general
principle that shows Comte was wrong to think it was (objectively) impossible
to know the composition of the stars. Rather, his error was in deriving the
impossibility from his philosophy and expecting science to abide by it. Since
some limit to our knowledge is a consequence of our science, we should believe
in it as much as we believe in our science. We should not think that this forever
closes the matter— any more than we should think our present science will
stand forever.
Perhaps Peirce would still have objected to this weak, fallibilist agnosticism.
Given developments in modern physics, however, I don’t see how we have any
other choice.
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Notes
1

This passage appears in a section that Peirce probably planned to omit
from the lecture. (See Turisi’s editorial note [Pei97, p. 272].) Since the section
would have been a digression in the lecture, I suggest that the omission was
for rhetorical reasons and not because of any second thoughts about the ideas
expressed.
2

This framework is developed at greater length elsewhere; e.g., [Mag03] and
[Mag].
3

Developing themes from Peirce, Hookway [Hoo02, ch. 10] argues that cognitive habits play a crucial rôle in enquiry.
4

The entailment presumes a slightly cartooned version of relativity, but the
complications are incidental to the argument here.
5

Perhaps the question could be decided without a clinical trial, for instance
with an epidemiological study of a population that took the drug recreationally.
The scope of the underdetermination, then, must also exclude circumstances
where such populations exist.
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